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Introduction 
Four of the largest conglomerates in South Korea are Samsung Group, Hyundai-KIA 
Automotive Group, LG Group and SK Telecom. In 2009, the joint market value of the assets 
these conglomerates owned amounted to around half of the South Korean GDP (Wang 
2010). Ostensibly, the South Korean economy is dominated by the conglomerates. Samsung 
and LG are the two major players in Korea’s electronics industry; Hyundai and KIA are the 
two major players in the automotive industry. 
  The export dependency (Total Exports/GDP) of South Korea is 44.9% and its import 
dependency (Total Imports/GDP) is 38% (CIA 2010). This indicates that the South Korean 
economy is highly dependent on global trade as well as on the conglomerates. It has signed 
a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the European Union and will ratify FTAs with some of 
its other trading partners such as China, United States, Japan and Australia (YONHAP News 
Agency 2010a).  It is our view that such changes in trade policy are supported by the 
conglomerates, which have considerable sway over the government, due to their 
significant contributions to the economy.  
  The purpose of this paper is to analyse the source and the nature of the impediments the 
government faces in implementing policies that enable freer trade in South Korea.  We do 
this from the perspective of President Lee Myun-bak, who we characterise as a key veto 
player, as he draws political support from groups that have conflicting agendas. 
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Analysis 
Our analysis in this section is based on employing the theoretical ideas of New Trade theory 
to assess the trade realities in South Korea, a two-level game to characterise its political 
economy constraints pertaining to altering trade-related policies and finally, the 
determinacy paradox to suggest the mechanism which suggests why the overall situation 
often appears resistant to change. 
  South Korea’s post-War economic growth can arguably be attributed to the application of 
the New Trade theory, which argues in favour of more protectionist policies in favour of 
key industries especially during the earlier phases of their development. Using the channel, 
the government was able to increase their economic competitiveness and dramatically 
improved GDP.  It is reasonable to assume that, more recently, in the face of increasing 
trade competition from other developing countries in the region, the ratification of FTAs 
with some of its key trading partners would enable South Korea to entrench its trade ties 
and ensure economic growth into the future.  
  However, in attempting to propose and successfully ratify FTAs, the President ends up 
facing a dilemma, which we will characterise below as a two-level game. Essentially, he 
needs to satisfy the minority electorate that supports the government's initiatives on 
trade-related policies at the international level, while placating the majority electorate that 
wants the government to focus on more protectionist domestic policies instead. This leads 
him into an impasse; he cannot select the best policy that satisfies both groups, hence 
creating what can be described as a determinacy paradox. 
 
New Trade Theory  
The New Trade theory suggests subsidising and protecting certain domestic industries 
from foreign competition in order to develop their competitive advantage in the global 
market (Krugman 1992). For instance, the government encouraged the growth of 
conglomerates and made large domestic mergers & acquisitions (M&A) transactions, 
putting a high priority particularly on the manufacturing and finance industries (Kim & 
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Paul 2009). South Korea’s shipbuilding and electronics industries have famously received 
subsidies from the government in the past (Kelly-Garrison 2009). 
  As M&A led to larger oligopolies, the conglomerates had more capital available to exploit 
scale economies, including developing new technologies, than they would have had in a 
highly competitive domestic market. The resulting large domestic electronics and 
automobile firms were encouraged to compete with their international rivals. 
  This led to the creation of a two-tier economy, where the first-tier, consisting of large 
conglomerates, experienced dramatic growth, while the second-tier, consisting of smaller 
businesses and ordinary people, struggled to make ends meet. In fact, the first tier often 
grew at the detriment of the second tier. For instance, in order to be price competitive on a 
global scale, the conglomerates prevented their subcontractors from hiking their 
production costs (Lee 2010a). As a result, a conflict brewed between the conglomerates and 
the small businesses, creating an impediment for the government’s intensive export-
oriented trade strategy. 
 
Two-Level Game 
The dilemma that the South Korean government increasingly faced in trying to appease the 
supporters of both levels that characterise the economy can usefully be illustrated as a two-
level game (Putnam 1988). 
  The source of the dilemma, which forms the basis of the two levels in the game, is simple. 
Smaller firms that had a focus primarily at the national level demand their government 
create policies that work in their favour. The conglomerates and the politicians that they 
actively supported had a more international focus, demanding that the government satisfy 
their needs contrary to the demands of smaller domestic firms. 
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TABLE 1: PROFITS MADE UNDER COMBINATIONS OF DIFFERENT TRADING POLICIES 
 
 European Union 
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ut
h
 
K
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ea
  Free Trade Protectionism 
Free Trade 800, 800 100, 1000 
Protectionism 1000, 100 200, 200 
 
 
Table 1 illustrates the political “prisoner’s dilemma” in a two-level game situation using the 
example of South Korea and the European Union and the possible strategies of freer trade 
or protectionism. In a one-off or short-term game South Korea would be better off pursuing 
protectionism, regardless of the policy the EU pursues; likewise, the same is true for the EU 
too. Smaller domestic firms, and a President trying to seek short-term favour, would 
arguably favour this solution. Consequently, the game results in a Nash equilibrium where 
both countries would select protectionist policies, regardless of the fact that free trade is a 
superior strategy. 
  The game is resolved by realising that players at the international level usually have a 
longer-term focus. Conglomerates such as Samsung or Hyundai naturally have a longer-
term perspective than a locally operated firm might have. Similarly, both countries are also 
better off in the longer run if each continues to play free trade. Therefore, at the 
international level, the South Korean President, if he were representing the country, would 
endorse an FTA and the conglomerates would support his decision, albeit at the expense of 
the small businesses. Since the president can have incentives that are aligned with either 
small domestic firms or the conglomerates depending on his horizon in making decisions, 
he faces a dilemma.  
  At the national level, free trade does not appeal to small businesses, who endorse 
protectionism, at the expense of the conglomerates. Since free trade is likely to expose 
them to the risk of higher competition from foreign rivals in the domestic market, their 
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competitiveness may not be adequate to ensure their survival. It is therefore unsurprising 
that the President is planning to ratify FTAs with the US, China and Japan, but cannot do it 
so smoothly with the two conflicting agendas. 
 
Determinacy Paradox in Free Trade 
According to Bhagwati, this impasse is not uncommon when considering the political 
economy of trade policy. He proposes the determinacy paradox, which is a concept that 
relates to the observation that a given outcome cannot be altered unless the entity 
responsible for doing so has control over all the variables that it is dependent on (Bhagwati 
1989). In the case of the South Korean trade policy, there are many variables, as outlined 
below, that the President cannot possibly control. 
  Consider the fact that, according to the Big Mac Index as of 21st July 2010 (The Economist 
2010), the South Korean currency was undervalued by about 25%. Exporters could therefore 
gain a competitive advantage compared to other countries with relatively overvalued 
currencies. Naturally, because of this, importing become more costly, creating inflationary 
pressures. The price of imported goods indeed inflated by 11.3% from May 2009 to May 2010 
(YONHAP News Agency 2010b) and the price of agricultural products leapt 16.1% from July 
2009 to July 2010 (Kim 2010). A key reason for the inflation is South Korea’s low food self-
sufficiency rate of 49% as of 2006 (Kwon 2010). The high dependency on food supply from 
other countries brings a risk of inflation in the case of a reduction in the international food 
supply. 
  The real jobless rate has also been increasing rapidly, hitting 10.35% in January 2010 (Lee 
2010b). The government expected the conglomerates to create job opportunities through 
their market share expansion in the global market. However, this has not been successful, 
leading to increased criticism against the government. 
There are many negative opinions and protests against FTAs with the US, China and other 
countries, as it may cause devastating damage to South Korean farmers and light 
manufacturing industries (Chosun Ilbo 2010). It would be hard for South Korean farmers to 
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compete with Chinese and American competitors who have stronger price competitive 
advantages. 
  The conglomerates represent the minority of voters who support FTAs and the 
government, as they have gained a price competitive advantage and made record profits 
through the undervalued currencies and subsidies.  By contrast, farmers and small 
businesses, the majority of voters, criticise the FTAs and President, as they are suffering 
from high inflation of imported goods due to the weak currency and high unemployment 
rates. 
  The two conflicting groups and the factors that affect them are externalities that take 
away degrees of freedom from the South Korean President and get in the way of him 
implementing free trade policies. Implementing an unpopular policy could lead him to lose 
the re-election. Therefore, in order to stay in power, he would need to shift his policies to 
favour the smaller businesses and farmers who represent the majority of the electorate. 
 
A Look Ahead 
In light of this situation and our analysis, we conclude with the following as a resolution to 
the seemingly irremediable problem we have outlined in this paper that could help the 
President to reduce the conflict between the two factions in the economy. 
  The President could subsidise small businesses and farmers so that subcontractors to the 
conglomerates can still provide competitive prices to them, and farmers would be able to 
raise the country’s food self-sufficiency rate, which would then ease the food price 
inflation. These subsidies could partly be financed by retracting them gradually from the 
conglomerates. Since they are no longer infant industries, their subsidies should ideally be 
scaled downwards anyway.  
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